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The preceding chapter argued that data is the “new 
oil” or the “oxygen” of the digital economy. A simi-
lar analogy can be applied to cloud computing. Just 
as the economic value of oil depends on special-
ised infrastructure for extraction, refining, storage, 
and transportation, the economic value of data de-
pends on the internet backbone as well as server 
infrastructure for storage and processing. With this 
in mind, this chapter will analyse the geopolitics of 
cloud computing, focusing on the issue of control 
over cloud infrastructure as well as control over 
data stored this way. It will argue that cloud ser-
vice providers (CSPs) have become not only one 
of the fundamental building blocks of the digital 
economy, but also play an important geopolitical 
role and are factors of strategic competition be-
tween states. 
Cloud CoMputing – a brief overview
Cloud computing is best defined as “ubiqui-
tous, convenient, on-demand network access 
to a shared pool of configurable computing re-
sources”1 such as storage, applications and 
services. It is composed of three service mod-
els: Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), Platform 
asa Service (PaaS) and Software as a Service (SaaS), 
offering various degrees of access to infrastruc-
ture and software solutions, depending on the 
customer’s needs. Storing data in the cloud and 
offering cloud-based services has several bene-
fits for the customer. Most notably, companies do 
not have to maintain their own servers and large 
departments tasked with running and protecting 
those servers from cyberattacks, but can draw 
on resources, software, and expertise provided 
by CSPs, which, due to economies of scale, can do 
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so in a financially competitive way. It is therefore 
no wonder that cloud computing has drawn cli-
ents both from the private and public sectors, in-
cluding whole governmental departments. Cloud 
computing also has major benefits for the users, 
who can access their data and applications on the 
device of their choice over the Internet.
The cloud computing market has been developed – 
and is still dominated by – three major American 
tech companies: Amazon (Amazon Web Services), 
Microsoft (Microsoft Azure), and Alphabet (Google 
Cloud Platform),2 who together hold 59% of world-
wide market share (estimated at uSD 100 billion 
in 2019), with smaller American operators like IBM 
and Oracle adding another 8%.3 Chinese compa-
nies are also dynamically expanding their cloud in-
frastructure, with Alibaba and Tencent being the 
biggest players.4 The market is only set to grow: 
the European union estimates that between 2018 
and 2025 the global data volume will grow five 
times, from 33 to 175 zettabytes.5 At the same 
time, the estimates show that there will be a shift 
from cloud to edge computing, i.e. distributed data 
storage and processing on smart connected ob-
jects, resulting in 20% of data processing being 
done through centralised computing facilities (data 
centres) and 80% through smart connected objects 
(as opposed to 80% data centres and 20% smart 
objects in 2018).6 Nevertheless, even under this 
scenario the importance of cloud computing will 
continue to grow.
The main characteristic of cloud computing is data 
mobility and portability. Data no longer needs to 
be stored locally. Instead, it can be stored in large 
server parks operated by cloud storage providers 
and telecommunications companies and accessed 
ad hoc from any place on earth (provided it has 
an internet connection) through the web browser 
or a dedicated application.7 This gives cloud data 
four unique characteristics which will be important 
for our further analysis: 
• high mobility of data and ease of transfer 
over state borders, 
• divisibility and partitionability of data, 
leading to it being stored on servers in 
multiple locations, 
• independence of location, leading to easy 
remote access, and 
• location of data is a business decision of 
CSPs, unless states impose data localisa-
tion rules.8
cloud computinG and Geopolitics
Although data is highly mobile and independent 
of location, the cloud computing market is not 
free from significant geopolitical considerations, 
influences, and effects. Both the nationality of 
cloud service operators and the choice of loca-
tion for their data centres have significant geo-
political consequences. The first consequence is 
in terms of technological innovation and business 
opportunities. having access to and being able to 
develop cloud technology gives states and their 
businesses better chances for faster growth of 
their digital economies. The location of data cen-
tres, while a business decision of the CSPs, usu-
ally depends on several key factors, such as the 
proximity to the internet backbone (favouring 
proximity to large Internet Access Points), prox-
imity to customers and skilled workforce, secu-
rity, energy prices, yearly average temperatures 
(due to cooling demands for the servers), and the 
legal environment.9 It is therefore not surprising 
that most data centres are located in big, inter-
nationally connected cities in economically de-
veloped states. A strong economy fuels demand 
for cloud computing capacities, which in turn 
fuel the growth of the digital economy and at-
tract businesses not only from the state in which 
a data centre operates but also from neighbouring 
states. In this way, this technology helps to de-
velop certain locations into regional technological 
and economic hubs.
The second consequence is in terms of control 
which a state can exercise over cloud service pro-
viders. This is because under international law 
states have jurisdiction – i.e. the power to set and 
enforce laws – over persons and objects located 
on their territory.10 This means that states may ap-
ply their laws to CSPs operating within their ter-
ritory as well as to data located on servers within 
their borders. This fact gives states on whose ter-
ritory data centres are located a high degree of 
control over not only their own citizens’ data but 
also data of citizens and foreign entities stored 
therein. This degree of control may be important in 
pursuit of legitimate purposes, such as for instance 
law enforcement, but may also raise concerns over 
the privacy as well as security of data transferred 
to and stored in foreign jurisdictions. These con-
cerns are greater still when a state not only has 
control over the operations of CSPs within its ter-
ritory, but can set and enforce rules which affect 
CSPs’ operations worldwide. This is especially the 
case when cloud service providers, such as the big 
three Amazon, Microsoft, and Google, are legally 
domiciled in one country.
the Microsoft ireland 
case & the cloud act
The degree of state control over cloud service 
providers is perhaps best demonstrated in the 
Microsoft Ireland case. It began in 2013 when fed-
eral prosecutors in the Southern District of New 
york sought and obtained a warrant for the search 
and seizure of information, including e-mail, stored 
in a specified account hosted by Microsoft to dis-
close the contents of a suspect’s messages in an 
investigation related to drug trafficking.11 Microsoft 
provided communications metadata stored on serv-
ers in the united States, but refused to hand over 
content data stored on servers in Ireland noting 
that the Government sought information by means 
of a warrant under section 2703(a) of the Stored 
Communications Act (SCA)12 and arguing that the 
court does not have authority to issue a warrant for 
an extraterritorial search.13 The Magistrate Judge 
issued the warrant nonetheless, holding that the 
warrant under section 2703(a) SCA does not im-
plicate issues of extraterritoriality as the recipient 
of the subpoena is obliged to produce all infor-
mation in its possession, regardless of its storage, 
and the “search” of the e-mail content would occur 
in the united States.14
On appeal, the uS Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit (CoA) – overseeing Connecticut, New york, 
and vermont – reversed the Magistrate’s order.15 
The main issue under discussion by the CoA was 
whether the SCA warrant provisions permit their 
extraterritorial application,16 which would be nec-
essary to rebut the so-called presumption against 
extraterritoriality, which stipulates that a Statute 
does not have extraterritorial effect unless specifi-
cally provided for by Congress.a The CoA, after ana-
lysing the language of the Stored Communications 
Act, came to the conclusion that denying the extra-
territorial character of the remote access to e-mail 
content stored on a server in Ireland would mean 
that such a search would also be possible if the 
account holder were an Irish citizen and the dis-
closure would violate Irish law; this, in turn, would 
open up the united States to foreign governments’ 
reciprocal searches of data stored in the uS.17
The case eventually found its way to the Supreme 
Court,18 but the Supreme Court did not have the 
chance to decide the case, as Congress passed 
the Clarifying Lawful Overseas use of Data Act 
or CLOuD Act (h.R. 4943) two weeks after the 
oral hearings and before the Supreme Court had 
the chance to render a decision.19 The Act amends 
the Stored Communications Act by requiring ser-
vice providers subject to uS jurisdiction to pro-
duce data under an SCA warrant regardless of the 
location of the server where the data is stored.20 
To account for the possibility of conflicting legal 
a Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., uS Supreme 
Court, 561 u.S. 247, 130 S.Ct. 2869, [online:] https://
www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/09pdf/08-1191.
pdf; recently re-stated in RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European 
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obligations under the laws of the State where the 
data is stored, the CLOuD Act creates a mech-
anism for the electronic communication service 
providers to challenge the warrant.21 however, 
the conditions under which a warrant may be 
challenged are quite restrictive; to quash the war-
rant the provider has to reasonably believe and 
demonstrate that, first, the customer whose data is 
sought is not a united States person and does not 
reside in the united States and second, the handing 
over of data would violate the law of a “qualifying 
foreign government”.22 The Act further provides 
that only those foreign governments are quali-
fying, with which the united States has entered 
into an executive agreement and whose law pro-
vides reciprocal substantive and procedural op-
portunities.23 Finally, the CLOuD Act removes 
the prohibition under the SCA to disclose data 
to qualifying foreign governments of whom the 
Attorney General certifies that their domestic law 
offers substantive and procedural protections for 
privacy and respects universal human rights.24
The consequences of the CLOuD Act are there-
fore twofold. First, American law enforcement can 
compel American CSPs to produce any data held 
by them irrespective of the nationality of the data 
“owner” or the location where this data is stored. 
Second, uS law regulates when American CSPs 
may disclose data held by them to foreign gov-
ernments, even if this data belongs to those states’ 
citizens or companies. It has to be noted, however, 
that these consequences are not unique to the 
CLOuD Act, but may ensue whenever a state has 
jurisdiction over CSPs, as for instance China with 
Tencent and Alibaba.
european “diGital sovereiGnty”
It is not difficult to see that such a system gives 
a high level of control over data to one or a handful 
of states where CSPs are domiciled or run data cen-
tres (controlling states), while at the same time leav-
ing all other states with the difficult choice of either 
accepting an asymmetrical power relationship and 
dependence on the cooperation and goodwill of 
the controlling states with regard to data access 
(given that only the controlling state can effectively 
enforce its rules against a CSP) or rejecting the cur-
rent cloud computing model and thereby risking to 
be cut off from key technology. Dependence on 
American CSPs and the resulting de facto extra-
territoriality of American law may be acceptable 
to many because the united States is a democracy 
and a rule of law state, thereby reducing the risk of 
abuse of power. But even between allies, control 
over data has become an issue not only of busi-
ness practicalities, but more than that – an issue 
of sovereignty. This is most impressively evidenced 
by recent steps of the European union and cer-
tain of its member states to establish an alternative 
cloud computing model, which would help rebuild 
European “digital sovereignty”.
The notion of “digital sovereignty” was first de-
veloped by in France (souveraineté numérique).25 
In 2019, the French Senate convened a Commission 
d’enquête on the topic of digital sovereignty with 
the view of studying the issue and formulating pol-
icy recommendations. Its final report, presented 
by Rapporteur Gérard Longuet, critically exam-
ined, among others, the question of cloud stor-
age and extraterritorial jurisdiction.26 It held that in 
the modern world data had become an economic 
strategic issue (enjeu économique stratégique), 
of immense importance for the activities of the 
major actors in the digital economy.27 The report 
discussed the question of data localisation as one 
of the modes of protecting data, but found it an 
imperfect solution.28 It found that data localisation 
rules might be important with respect to securing 
digital sovereignty in three instances: to protect 
the “strategic” or particularly sensible data such 
as public data of sovereign importance, private 
 financial data or commercial secrets, to guarantee 
access to essential services, and to support the 
industrial ecosystem of cloud providers.29 The re-
port noted, however, that data localisation clauses 
do not ameliorate the risks posed both by extra-
territorial legislation such as the CLOuD Act and 
by the dependence of certain technology com-
panies on their states (as with certain Chinese 
companies).30 It criticised the CLOuD Act as be-
ing too broad with respect to the affected entities, 
the infractions covered, and the type and amount 
of data collected;31 it also found the Act to pose 
a risk of access by American law enforcement to 
strategic data of legal persons (such as trade se-
crets) and to be incompatible with the GDPR with 
regard to the protection of personal data.32
To mitigate those risks the report recommends to 
consider three options: first, the legal separation 
of subsidiary companies for each region and geo-
graphical location of services, so that uS law en-
forcement access would not affect European data, 
second, mobilising companies on a case-by-case ba-
sis to contest exorbitant law enforcement demands 
in court, and third, the extensive use of robust data 
encryption technologies.33 Similar to the report 
of 26 June 2019, prepared for the French Prime 
Minister by Raphaël Gauvain,34 the Longuet Report 
advises strengthening the 1968 law on blocking 
measures, extending the protections of the GDPR 
to non-personal data of legal persons, and encour-
aging the fast conclusion of a cooperation agree-
ment between the European union and the uS.35
While none of these measures have been im-
plemented at the time of writing, what becomes 
clear from the Gauvain and Longuet Reports is 
that France is deeply concerned with American 
(and Chinese) extraterritorial reach, brought about 
by their dominance of the software and hardware 
sectors respectively. Therefore, the French view 
is that it has to take robust action – both legisla-
tive and in terms of industrial policy – to protect 
French data and French strategic interests against 
the reach of foreign states, even like-minded states 
such as the uS.
Similar considerations underpin the German po-
sition with respect to American cloud services. 
Ever since the Snowden revelations, Germany 
has been deeply worried about the access of 
the uS National Security Agency (NSA) and uS 
law enforcement to German data. The federal 
government has repeatedly stressed that while 
it recognises the importance of facing novel chal-
lenges to law enforcement posed by the prolif-
eration of transnational cloud services, any legal 
solution needs to respect fundamental human 
rights guarantees and facilitate cooperation be-
tween states. To this end, it advocates rapid ne-
gotiations between the European Commission 
and the uS government to conclude a coopera-
tion agreement on data sharing, as envisaged by 
the CLOuD Act.36 however, besides international 
cooperation, Germany also seeks to secure its own 
“digital sovereignty” (digitale Souveränität), limiting 
uS law enforcement access to German data. This 
is done via two routes: first, by limiting the type 
of data which can be stored on uS cloud services 
and second, by developing an autonomous cloud 
storage solution. To address these concerns, on 
29 October 2019, the German government has 
launched the GAIA-x project.b The stated motiva-
tion for this project is to preserve European “data 
sovereignty” (Datensouveränität) against increas-
ing dependence on foreign digital technologies.37 
To this end, Germany wants to create a data infra-
structure which would guarantee European con-
trol – and control by Europeans themselves – over 
the data of European citizens and reduce depen-
dence on foreign cloud service providers.38 This 
is to be done by linking centralised and decen-
tralised infrastructures (cloud and edge-services) 
into one coherent system, based on open tech-
nologies and providing interfaces for the facilita-
tion of data exchange and use of applications.39 
Crucially, this is to be done on the basis of ex-
isting and yet-to-be-built European services and 
infrastructure and cutting out uS-headquartered 
CSPs, thereby limiting the exposure to American 
law enforcement. The Gaia-x project has been re-
cently supported by the European Commission, 
which in the “European strategy for data” aims at 
developing common European data spaces and 
b The GAIA-x Report is also available in English as: 
Project GAIA-X. A Federated Data Infrastructure as the Cradle 
of a Vibrant European Ecosystem, Bundesministerium für 
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interconnecting cloud infrastructures and enabling 
access to “competitive, secure and fair” European 
cloud services.40 The urgency of European solu-
tions in the field of cloud computing is highlighted 
by the Court of Justice of the European union’s 
decision in the Schrems II case, where the Court 
decided that the domestic law of the united States 
does not offer protections of Europeans’ personal 
data that are essentially equivalent to those re-
quired under Eu law and thus invalidated the 
Eu-uS Privacy Shield (data protection rules and 
obligations for uS companies from 2016), render-
ing transfers of European personal data to the uS 
impermissible.41
the chinese threat and the clean 
network initiative
The abovementioned examples show that even al-
lies can have reservations against excessive extra-
territorial jurisdiction of a friendly power and may 
wish to develop their own capacities. The threat 
is much greater when cloud computing infrastruc-
ture and operators are under the jurisdiction of 
an adversarial power such as China. In this case, 
security concerns over the amount of Chinese 
state control over its CSPs such as Tencent and 
Alibaba, paired with the lack of robust legal pro-
tections, as well as examples of past malpractices 
(such as the theft of intellectual property) have led 
the uS State Department to announce the Clean 
Network program42. The program aims to protect 
America’s critical telecommunications and tech-
nology infrastructure and its Clean Cloud compo-
nent stipulates that sensitive personal information 
and intellectual property should not be “stored and 
processed on cloud-based systems accessible to 
our foreign adversaries through companies such 
as Alibaba, Baidu, and Tencent”.
is there a middle way? 
the case of poland
The preceding sections argued that cloud comput-
ing has significant geopolitical effects due to the 
control over data that a state can exercise if CSPs 
are incorporated or data centres located in its ter-
ritory. States may choose different strategies to 
cope with the resulting power asymmetries: from 
acquiescence and various degrees of cooperation 
to contestation, blocking adversarial cloud comput-
ing platforms, and developing their own capabilities.
It has to be noted, however, that not  every European 
State follows the path of achieving digital sover-
eignty through the exclusion of foreign CSPs from 
access to key data. In 2018 the Polish government 
launched the programme Common Information 
Infrastructure of the State (Wspólna Infrastruktura 
Informatyczna Państwa, WIIP), which aims at creat-
ing two public cloud services: Public Computational 
Clouds (Publiczne Chmury Obliczeniowe) and 
a Governmental Computational Cloud (Rządowa 
Chmura Obliczeniowa).43 With this, the Polish gov-
ernment does not exclude foreign cloud service 
providers, but rather applies different security and 
access standards to different types of data. For in-
stance, the Public Computational Cloud (or simply 
“National Cloud”, Chmura Krajowa) will be set up in 
partnership with Google, which will build a Google 
Cloud hub in Warsaw. Currently, the largest and 
strategic client of the National Cloud is the largest 
bank in Poland, PKO BP and the National Cloud is 
aimed predominately at the private sector. In con-
trast, public and local administration will be able to 
use the Governmental Computational Cloud. For 
this public cloud, the government will set up se-
curity requirements and a Governmental Security 
Cluster (Rządowy Klaster Bezpieczeństwa), pre-
sumably for the most sensitive data.44 It remains 
to be seen whether Poland will exclude foreign 
CSPs from this Governmental Security Cluster or 
try to secure governmental data contractually and 
through encryption. It has to be noted, however, 
that Poland cannot rely on big national cloud ser-
vice providers and therefore is dependent on out-
side expertise for its national cloud and this thus 
limited in a potential quest for digital sovereignty.
Looking more broadly on Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE), the situation is quite similar. 
According to two recent studies,45 CEE states are 
expected to have more than 365 million inter-
net users and over 2 billion connected devices by 
2022. At the same time, only 13.1% of surveyed 
companies in the region have completed their 
digital transformation (which includes cloud com-
puting use), while 76.4% of companies take their 
first steps in this direction. Both factors combined 
point to a dynamic growth of the cloud computing 
market in CEE and increased demand for invest-
ments in data infrastructure in the region. Similar 
to Poland, other CEE states do not have large na-
tional CSPs which could shoulder this investment 
either and will need to decide how to develop their 
cloud computing markets to best serve the needs 
of both the public and private sectors. here, again, 
the choice will be driven as much by geopolitical 
as by business considerations.
conclusion
This article has argued that cloud computing should 
not be regarded purely through the business lens. 
Rather, due to the importance of data for the mod-
ern digital economy and national security, the capa-
bilities to store and process data in the cloud have 
attained special importance for a states’ technolog-
ical or digital sovereignty and thus form an import-
ant factor in current geo-economics and geopolitics. 
Recent examples such as the uS CLOuD Act, 
European efforts to develop own cloud platforms 
and American efforts to protect sensitive private 
and business data from the reach of the Chinese 
state are a case in point. In this adversarial envi-
ronment, Central Europe must choose which path 
to follow. Due to its values (such as the rule of law 
and protection of fundamental rights) and alliances, 
it seems obvious Three Seas states cannot fall 
into technological dependence on China. Rather, 
they should strive to develop its own capabilities, 
in cooperation with American and European allies. 
The Polish public and governmental cloud initia-
tives are a step in this direction and may therefore 
be a model to follow.
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